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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
LEO PORTER and NORA PORTER, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
-vs.-
HYRUM: PRICE, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Case No. 9151 
RESPONDENT·s BRIEF 
ADMISSION OF FACTS 
Respondent agrees with the facts as stated by the 
appellants except in the particulars and details set forth 
in respondent's statement of facts hereafter. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Mr. Price, the respondent, has no recollection of the 
route which he followed from Lincoln Avenue and 
Twenty-Fourth Street, and while it is agreed that he 
drove fifteen or sixteen blocks through traffic and nego-
tiated an undetermined number of traffic control devices, 
the exact route he followed and exact number of sema-
phore signals is unknown. (Transcript 91, 92, 93). It is 
also agreed that Mr. Price had had insulin reactions prior 
to the time of the accident, however, none of them were 
severe and none were of such a nature or in such a degree 
as to incapacitate him or make him unable to operate an 
automobile. (Tr. 166, 167, 174, 208, 155, 156) Further, 
he had always experienced warning symptoms at the on-
set of the relatively minor insulin reactions which he had 
experienced in the past, and had controlled them by candy 
or food. He had no warnings at the onset of the insulin 
reaction from which this accident resulted, although he 
did have either candy or an orange available in his auto-
mobile. (Tr. 93, 94, 167, 170, 173, 174) The evidence is 
further clear from the medical experts who were called, 
that it is possible for a diabetic at the onset of an insulin 
reaction to lose voluntary control and thus be unable to 
control the reaction even though means to do so might 
be at hand, and it is possible for a diabetic to have a 
reaction even though he follows medical directions and 
cares for himself in every respect. (Tr. 139, 146, 147, 
158, 128, 129) l\1:r. Price did not testify that he had a 
clear recollection of taking 65 or 70 units of insulin on 
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the morning of the accident, but to the contrary testified 
that he had a clear recollection of taking the prescribed 
dosage, although he could not recall at the time of the 
deposition the exact amount of such dosage, since his 
dosage had been changed from time to time as his con-
dition varied over the seventeen years during which he 
had suffered from diabetes. The fact that the dosage 
was subject to change was confirmed by the doctor who 
cared for his diabetic condition over the past three years, 
Dr. Drew Petersen. (Tr.161, 165, 168, 169, 175) 
His story with respect to driving the automobile 
without a conscious recollection through the traffic 
situation described was said to be a reasonable thing to 
expect a diabetic to do in an insulin reaction by both of 
the medical experts called. (Tr. 122, 123, 139, 140) Dr. 
Petersen also testified that Mr. Price was well regulated 
at the time of the accident and that it was possible for a 
well regulated diabetic to undergo an insulin reaction 
which might not have warning symptoms and which might 
not be subject to voluntary control, however, that such a 
reaction as described here would be unusual or rare. 
(Tr.156, 158) He further testified that the same thing 
could happen to a person having a fainting spell, such 
as a woman might experience during her menstrual 
period. (Tr. 160) 
Contrary to counsel's statement of facts in appel-
lant's brief, Dr. 0. N. Lewis (Tr. 120) did not diagnose 
defendant's condition as resulting from more insulin than 
was needed on the day in question. He merely indicated 
that this might be a cause of such a condition. 
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It must be conceded by appellant that Dr. 0. N. 
Lewis, at no time, treated or examined defendant, and 
while he said it was unlikely defendant would not have 
premonitory symptoms of the reaction, he certainly did 
not say that it was impossible for this to be the case. 
(Tr.121). 
Both medical experts called, testified that their dia-
betic patients drive automobiles. (Tr. 125, 141) It is im-
portant to further note that there was absolutely no evi-
dence to the effect that defendant had anything but a 
normal, usual days activities as to eating habits, working 
and taking of medication. The evidence on this point 
is supplied by Mr. Price and his wife, Bonnie Price, both 
of whom testify that he followed his normal routine for 
an average day. (Tr. 169-172, 205). It is to be further 
noted that l\fr. Price took a daily test of his urine to 
ascertain whether his condition was well regulated and 
that he performed this test on the day of the accident 
as was his usual practice ( Tr. 168) and found nothing out 
of the ordinary. 
The evidence is also uncontradicted on the point that 
all persons who observed him on the day of the accident 
found him to be normal in appearance prior to the time 
he drove his car into Ogden. These include Kenneth W. 
McClannon (Tr. 191) and Tony Ledesma (Tr. 197, 198), 
who rode in the car pool with him. However, immediately 
prior to the accident an acquaintance, Robert A. Call, 
observed him driving his automobile in an erratic manner 
and testified that he appeared to be in a stupor. (Tr.ll) 
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All the witnesses who observed him at the scene gave 
similar testimony. (Tr. 32, 38, 66, 68, 75, 76) And all oi 
the symptoms described were stated by the medical ex-
perts to be consistant with a diagnosis of insulin reaction. 
(Tr.126, 136, 137) 
STATEMENT OF POINTS TO BE ARGUED 
POINT I. 
THAT THERE IS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUP-
PORT THE VERDICT OF THE JURY. 
POINT IL 
THAT THE COURT PROPERLY INSTRUCTED THE 
JURY AS TO THE APPLICABLE LAW, INCLUDING IN-
STRUCTIONS ON UN A VOIDABLE ACCIDENTS. 
POINT IlL 
THAT THE COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO GIVE 
PLAINTIFFS' REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 5. 
POINT IV. 
THAT THE COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO GIVE 
PLAINTIFFS' REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 9. 
POINT V. 
THAT THE COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO GIVE 
PLAINTIFFS' REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 10. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THAT THERE IS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUP-
PORT THE VERDICT OF THE JURY. 
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The law has been clearly stated on numerous occac 
sions by this Court with respect to the province of this 
Court in reviewing the verdict of a jury. A typical hold-
ing is found in the case of Coombs v. Perry, 2 Utah 2nd, 
381, 275 Pac. 2nd 680, the Court saying~ 
"The plaintiff having won a judgment below, 
the verdict is protected by bulwark of rules firmly 
established in our law. First, by the general prop= 
osition that the judgment and proceedings in thiS 
lower court are presumptively correct with the 
burden upon defendant to show errore Second, 
where a trial judge has passed upon a question 
and a jury presumably fair and impartial ha~ 
made a finding, while such is not controling, it i8 
at least entitled to some consideration and should 
not be wholly ignored in reviewing the situation 
and attempting to see as objectively as possible 
whether reasonable minds might so conclude. 
Third, that the Court must review the evidence 
together with every inference fairly arising there-
from in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, 
and similarly must consider any lack or failure 
of evidence in the same light, which we do in re-
viewing the facts here." 
Cited in support of this position are the following 
cases: Burton v. Z.C.M.I., Utah, :249 Pac. 2nd 514; 
Toomer's Estate v. Union Pacific Railroad Company, 
Utah, 239 Pac. 2nd 163; Great Ameri·can Indemnity Com-
pany v. Berryessa, Utah, 248 Pac. 2nd 367; McCollum v. 
Clothier, Utah, 2-ll Pac. 2nd 468. If, therefore, it is found 
that the jury in this case concluded as reasonable minds 
might conclude, based upon the evidence viewed in the 
light most favorable to defendant, and thus arrived at 
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its verdict, such verdict should not be reversed by this 
Court. The jury, as the triers of fact, are best able to ob-
serve the witnesses and their demeanor and to view the 
trial proceedings first hand so that they are in a much 
more advantageous position to determine the facts than 
is this Appellate Court. 
While it is true that Mr. Price had been a diabetic 
for seventeen years, appellant makes an incorrect asser-
tion in the statement that he had suffered several insulin 
reactions which if not checked would have caused him to 
lose consciousness. This conclusion appears nowhere 
in the record, the only evidence being that 1\Ir. Price had 
suffered prior reactions of mild or moderate degree, 
all of which had been preceeded by warning or premoni-
tory symptoms and none of which had incapacitated him. 
This testimony was elicited from l\Ir. Price, his wife, 
Mrs. Bonnie Price, and his physician, Dr. Drew Petersen. 
(Tr.155, 156, 166, 208) It is further testified that he was 
a conscientious and well regulated diabetic. (Tr. 135, 136, 
140, 167, 168, 170, 203, 204, 211) He had no reason to 
think that he might have such a reaction, having had none 
in the past, and such an occurance being rare according 
to all medical evidence in this case. ( Tr. 121, 123, 156) 
Dr. Drew Petersen, his physician and a specialist in in-
ternal medicine and diabetes, testified that a diabetic 
can, however, have such a reaction even though he is 
careful and conscientious in the care of his condition. 
(Tr.158) However, as the doctor testified, a similar loss 
of control of an automobile could come from any of a 
number of reasons, including occurances such as faint-
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ing during a menstrual period by a woman driver. (Tr, 
159, 160) Counsel's statement that Mr. Price admitted 
to taking an overdose is incorrect and has been discussed 
in the statement of facts. In fact, Mr. Price testified 
clearly and unequivocally that he took on the day of the 
accident and, in fact, always took the prescribed amount 
of insulin on which he was regulated and that he did not 
change the amount of his dosage without first consulting 
his doctor. This was born out by Dr. Petersen< (Tr. 135, 
136, 140, 141,169, 175) :Mr. Price testified further that 
he could not recall the exact amount of insulin on which 
he was regulated at the time of the accident, as his dosage 
had varied over the many years which he had suffered 
from the disease, but that he did take the prescribed 
amount. (Tr. 163,169, 175) 
The evidence is further clear that in the absence of 
some unusual activity of eating, working or medication 
there would be no reason to anticipate such a reaction, 
and Mr. Price had no such variance on the day of the 
accident. (Tr. 169-172, 205, 145) There is nothing to in~ 
dicate that Mr. Price's story was either inaccurate or 
false, and, in fact, both medical experts testified that his 
story, including the negotiating of traffic and traffic con-
trols, was reasonable and could well have happened if he 
were suffering from an insulin reaction. (Tr. 122, 139, 
140) There is no prohibition in Utah Law against a suf-
ferer from the disease of diabetes operating an automo-
bile. The only applicable code section is found at 41-6-64 
(C) Utah Code Annotated 1953. 
10 
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"It is unlawful and punishable as provided 
in subdivision D of this section for any person who 
is an habitual user of or under the influence of an 
narcotic drug, or who is under the influence of any 
other drug, to a degree which renders him incap-
able of safely driving a vehicle, to drive a vehicle 
within this State." 
The application for operators' license in the State 
of Utah specifically asks the question: 
"Have you ever suffered from epilepsy, heart 
trouble, paralysis, fainting or dizzy spells. Have 
you ever been addicted to narcotic drugs or in-
toxicating liquors~" 
It makes absolutely no reference to diabetes, the 
clear inference being that a controlled diabetic is a fit 
and proper person to operate an automobile. Appellant 
argues that defendant might, because of his diabetic con-
dition undergo an insulin reaction at any time. However, 
respondent contends this line of argument is fallacious. 
Followed to its ultimate conclusion it would prohibit 
anyone from driving an automobile on the basis that 
everyone knows that they will some day die, and that 
because it is impossible to predict exactly where or in 
what manner this unfortunate event will take place it 
thus is conceivable that it could happen while operating 
an automobile and, therefore, it is unsafe for anyone to 
drive. Defendant and respondent in this case was clearly 
a fit and able person to drive an automobile, having ex-
perienced no difficulties with his disease which would 
give him any warning or indication that he might not be 
able to properly operate an automobile. Further, even 
11 
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when he had undergone mild reactions in the past he had 
had warning symptoms which would have allowed him 
ample opportunity to pull an automobile off of the road, 
to eat the organge which he always carried in his lunch 
bucket on the way home from work (Tr.167, 170), to eat 
candy which he customarily carried with him, or to take 
other action which would avoid any mishap. The insulin 
reaction which caused the accident in this case was en-
tirely unforseeable and unforeseen and could have in no 
way been guarded against by defendant in the exercise of 
reasonable care. 
Counsel cites several cases almost all of which deal 
with the subject of epilepsy. It is to be noted that plain-
tiffs' own medical expert, Dr. Marvin 0. Lewis, testified 
that epilepsy was not controlable to the same extent as 
diabetes. (Tr. 126) It is also noted that epilepsy is one 
of the diseases specifically referred to in the application 
for Utah Driver's License. The text authorities and cases 
supporting defendant's position that the accident under 
the evidence in this case was unavoidable are numerous. 
Under the heading, "Negligence as a Basis of Liability 
for Injury - Liability for Unavoidable Accident," 5A 
Am. Jur. Autos, Section 193, p. 346-347, is found the 
following statement: 
"It is essential to the existance of liability for 
injuries caused by an automobile that there be 
some negligence, son1e fault on the part of the 
person sought to be held liable." 
The subject is also covered in Article Two of the 
Restatement of Torts which sets out the general propo-
12 
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sition that a person can only be liable for his conscious 
acts. 
A current and exhaustive treatment of the subject 
is found at 28 ALR 2nd, under the section cited below: 
"Fainting or momentary loss of consciousness 
while driving is a complete defense to an action 
based on negligence ... if such loss of conscious-
ness was not foreseeable." 
28 A.L.R. 2d, 35, § 15. 
Under this annotation are cited numerous cases cov-
ering fainting spells, heart attacks, menstrual fainting~ 
~oughing spells, etco 
"According to the great weight of authority)) 
an operator of a motor vehicle who becomes sud-
denly stricken by a fainting spell or otherwise 
loses consciousness while driving, and for this 
reason is unable to control the vehicle, is not 
chargeable with negligence or gross negligence if 
his loss of consciousness is due to an unforeseen 
cause." 
"Of course no fixed rule can be established 
to determine when or under what circumstances 
the driver must desist from driving a vehicle be-
cause of the danger of his losing consciousness, 
but it seems that the courts are rather lenient in 
this respect and it can certainly not be stated as a 
general rule that a person who knows that he is 
suffering from a heart condition or another ill-
ness which may cause his loss of consciousness at 
some future time is automatically at fault if he 
drives an automobile and, while doing so, loses 
consciousness, thereby causing an accident." (Em-
phasis added.) 
13 
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28 A.L.R. 2d 22, § 3 
Also in accord is 60 C.J.S. 1\Iotor Vehicle § 2640 
A similar rule is stated in Blashfield, Cyclopedia of 
Automobile Law. 
". . . a motorist stricken by paralysis, over-
come by poisonous gas, seized by a fit, or falling 
asleep, who still continues to drive and, while 
unconscious, causes injury to another, cannot be 
held therefor unless he was reasonably aware that 
he was about to lose consciousness to the extent 
that a person of ordinary prudence would not at-
tempt to continue driving." 
Blashfield, Cyclopedia of Automobile Law § 656 
(1948) 
While many of the authorities would seem to include 
the epileptic under the general classification thereby 
allowing him the same defense as asserted by defendant 
and respondent in this case, it is clear that epilepsy pre-
sents a much more difficult problem because of its 
greater difficulty to control than diabetes. Countless 
numbers of diabetics drive automobiles on the streets of 
our cities every day, as do countless numbers of sufferers 
from heart disease and other ailments which might 
possibly result in unconsciousness. Doctors do not advise 
them to desist from driving. (Tr. 125, 141) 
The case of State 1.:. Olson, 160 Pac. 2nd 427, cited by 
appellant is clearly distinguishable on two grounds. First, 
that the defendant in tl1is case felt drowsy but continued 
to drive, thereby having the warning symptoms referred 
14 
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to above, and second, that it was through a voluntary 
act of defendant that she allowed herself to become overly 
tired and from this her sleep and the accident resulted, 
the conclusion being that by getting proper rest she 
could have avoided this occurance. It is, therefore, re-
spondent's position that this holding has no application 
to the case at bar. 
In conclusion it is therefore argued that it is clear 
that a proper jury question of fact was raised under the 
applicable authorities as to the law, that the jury found 
the facts in favor of defendant, and properly returned 
a verdict of no cause of action in favor of defendant. 
POINT II. 
THAT THE COURT PROPERLY INSTRUCTED THE 
JURY AS TO THE APPLICABLE LAW, INCLUDING IN-
STRUCTIONS ON UN A VOIDABLE ACCIDENTS. 
Appellant challenges the instruction which is quoted 
in appellant's brief and which was given as instruction 
No. 8 by the Court. In order to properly evaluate this 
instruction it must be construed as are all instructions 
in context with all the other instructions given by the 
Court in this case. In fact, this specific instruction was 
given to the jury as part of instruction No. 22 given by 
the Court. 
" ... you are not to single out any sentence 
or any individual point or instruction and ignore 
the others, but you are to consider all the instruc-
tions, as a whole, and to regard each in the light 
of all the others." 
Instructions which bear directly or indirectly on in-
struction No. 8 as given include instructions No. 3, 5, 7, 
15 
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9, 10, 11 and 12, and the Court's attention is respectfully 
directed to these instructions as transmitted in the Record 
from the District Court. Instructions No. 9 and 10 bear 
most directly on the problem at hand and we, therefore, 
set forth hereafter instruction No. 8 on which error 
is assigned, instruction No. 9 and instruction No. 10. 
Instruction No. 8 : 
"The law recognizes unavoidable accidents. 
An unavoidable accident is one which occurs in 
such a manner that it cannot justly be said to have 
been proximately caused by negligence as those 
terms are herein defined. In the event a party is 
damaged by an unavoidable accident, he has no 
right to recover, since the law requires that a per-
son be injured by the fault or negligence of an-
other as a prerequisite to any right to recover 
damages.'' 
Instruction No. 9 : 
"A driver of an automobile who is stricken 
by paralysis, seized by a fit or otherwise rendered 
unconscious and who still continues to drive while 
unconscious and causes damages or injury to an-
other cannot be held responsible therefore unless 
he was reasonbly aware that he was about to lose 
consciousness to the extent that a person of ordin-
ary prudence would not attempt to continue driv-
ing." 
Instruction No. 10 : 
"You are instructed that fainting or loss of 
consciousness while driving is a complete defens6 
to an action based on negligence if such loss of 
consciousness was not foreseeable. If you find 
that defendant Hyrum Price was suffering from 
16 
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an unforeseen insulin reaction, resulting in a 
fainting spell or loss of consciousness at the time 
of this accident, then you must return a verdict 
in favor of the defendant and against the plain-
tiffs. 
"On the other hand, if the insulin shock that 
defendant suffered was forseeable and he could 
have done something about it, and thereby avoided 
the accident, then and in that event he would be 
charged with negligence proximately causing the 
accident" 
While appellant summarily disposes of Nelson Vo 
Lott, 17 Pac. 2nd, 272, with the statement that it is not 
substantial authority for the instruction, we respectfully 
invite the Court's attention to page 275 of this case. In 
the Nelson v. Lott case appellant assigned as error the-
court's instruction No. 10 which read as follows: 
"You are instructed that if you believe from 
the evidence that the injury to plaintiff was a 
result of unavoidable accident and that the de-
fendant's negligence was not the cause thereof 
your verdict should be in favor of defendant, no 
cause of action." 
The Court stated as follows: 
"Appellant contends that the instruction is 
contrary to law and misleading in that it assumes 
that an unavoidable accident could be caused by 
defendant's negligence. The instruction would 
have been sufficient without the words, 'and that 
the defendant's negligence was not the cause 
thereof/ 
"However, the writer is inclined to think the 
jury would interpret the instruction to mean that 
17 
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if they should believe the injury to the plaintiff 
was a result of unavoidable accident and not of 
negligence on the part of defendant, then verdict 
should be in favor of defendant. We think the 
word 'thereof' refers to the word 'injury' and not 
the word 'accident.' While the instruction is open 
to criticism we are of the opinion that it was not 
prejudicial." 
The case, therefore, seems to clearly sanction the 
words "unavoidable accident" and the instruction with 
relation to unavoidable accident as being a defense. 
The subject is treated under the general heading "in-
evitable accident" in Blashfield, Cyclopedia of Automo-
bile Law and Practice 1 Part II, § 635. Numerous cases 
are cited in support of the unavoidable accident theory 
and the words "unavoidable accident" and "inevitable 
accident" are used throughout the cases and the text, 
It is further noted that the Court spelled out in great 
detail the applicable law in Instructions No. 9 and 10 
as well as in Instruction No. 8 on which appellant assigns 
error. 
The cases of Karlburg v. Wesley Hospital and Nurse 
Tra~ning School 323 Pac. 2nd 638 (Kansas); Paski.Z v. 
Leigh Rich Corp., 340 Pac. 2nd 741, (Cal.), are both clear-
ly distinguishable on the grounds of concurrent negli-
gence together with the circumstance claimed to give rise 
to the unavoidable accident and the question of foresee-
ability which was obviously decided in this case in favor 
of defendant based on the evidence to which the Court 
has been referred in preceeding sections of this brief, 
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California has adopted the general rule with respect 
to unavoidable accidents and non-liability of a non-negli= 
gent defendant in the case of Ford v. Carew and English, 
200 Pac. 2nd 828. Other cases in accord include Cohen 
v. Petty, 65 F, 2d 820 (D.C. Circuit) 1955; Armstrong 
Vo Cook, 227 N.W. 433, 138 A.L.R. 1396; Bridges v. Speer, 
(Fla,) 79 So. 2d 679; Lehman v. Haynam, (Ohio) 133 
N,E. 2d 97; LaVigne v. LaVigne (Oregon) 158 P. 2d 557. 
In Prosser's generally recognized work on Torts, the 
following statement is found~ 
"An unavoidable accident is an unintended 
occurrance which could not have been prevented 
by the exercise of reasonable care. In general, 
under modern law there is no liability for un-
avoidable accident." 
Prosser Torts, page 117. 
"On the other hand a transitory unconscious-
ness or delirium due to illness commonly is re-
garded as a circumstance depriving the actor of 
control over his conduct which will absolve him 
from liability." 
Prosser Torts, page 127 (2nd Edition 1955) 
Appellant therefore urges that the instructions of 
the Court considered as a whole were a clear and proper 
statement of the law and that no error exists in thiS-
regard. 
POINT IlL 
THAT THE COURT PROPERLY REFUSED 'TO GIVE 
PLAINTIFFS' REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 5. 
Plaintiff claims error on the basis of the Court's fail-
ure to instruct the jury in accordance with plaintiffs,. 
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requested instruction No. 5 which is set forth hereafter. 
"If the defendant, Hyrum Price, knew that 
because of his diabetic condition he was subject to 
attacks in the course of which he was likely to lose 
consciousness but nevertheless operated a motor 
vehicle on a public highway and while in a state of 
unconsciousness caused by his diabetic condition, 
drove his automobile onto the wrong side of the 
road and into the automobile in which plaintiff 
Nora Porter was seated, causing damage to the 
motor vehicle owned by Leo Porter and injury to 
Nora Porter, you will find the defendant, Hyrum 
Price, was negligent in causing the said collision 
and will award judgment to the plaintiffs for such 
damages and injuries as you find were caused by 
and are the proximate result of defendant's negli-
gence." 
This general subject matter including the essential 
elements of unavoidable accident, and foreseeability of 
the occurance were covered in the Court's instructions 
No.8, 9 and 10 which are quoted in the immediately pre-
ceeding section of this brief. 
It is further noted that this instruction is faulty in 
two respects. First, there is absolutely no evidence that 
Hyrum Price knew "he was subject to attacks in the 
course of which he was likely to lose consciousness" as no 
such attacks had occurred in the past and, in fact, medical 
evidence indicates that an occurance of the type which 
resulted in the accident in this case is unusual or rare, 
particularly where the diabetic was conscientious in his 
care of himself and was well regulated as was the defend-
ant, Mr. Price. Second, the requested instruction com-
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pletely omits the necessary element of foreseeability. All 
of the authorities seem to be in accord on the proposition 
that the unconsciousness must be reasonably foreseeable 
or must be subject to being guarded against by the exer-
cise of reasonable care. 
at~ 
"Fainting or momentary loss of consciousness 
while driving is a complete defense to an action 
based on negligence 0 •• if such loss of conscious-
ness was not foreseeable." 
28 A.L.R. 2d 35 §15 
In accord with this rule of law are authorities found 
5A Am. Jur. Prud. Auto§ 193 p. 346,347 
28 A.L.R. 2d 22 § 3 
60 C.J.S. Motor Veh. § 264 
Blashfield, Cyclopedia of Automobile Law § 656 
(1948) 
Prosser, Torts, p.l17, 127 (2d ed.l955) 
Cohen v. Petty, 65 F 2d 820 
Armstrong v. Cook, 227 N.W. 433, 138 ALR 1396 
Ford Vo Carew & English, (Cal.) 200 P, 2d 828 
The Court's attention is drawn to the distinction 
pointed out by respondent on appellant's claimed author-
ity under State v. Olson (Utah) 160 P. 2d 427, under 
Point I of this brief on the grounds of foreseeability and 
that it was based on an at least partially voluntary act of 
Defendant. With respect to Eleason v. Western Casualty 
and Surety Co., 35 N.W. 2d p. 301, it is noted that at page 
7 of appellant's brief where this case is also quoted ap-
pellant makes the following statement with respect to the 
facts of the case : 
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"It further appeared that the driver knew he 
was subject to spells or seizures rendering him 
unconscious although he did not know he had epil-
epsy." 
This is entirely contrary to the facts of the instant 
case as the evidence is uncontradicted to the effect that 
defendant had no knowledge he was subject to uncon-
sciousness as a result of his diabetic condition, and even 
in the instances where he had undergone a mild insulin 
reaction in the past he had experienced warning symp-
toms which would have been ample to allow him to avoid 
the accident as it occurred in this case. 
POINT IV. 
THAT THE COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO GIVE 
PLAINTIFFS' REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 9. 
Respondent again contends that the instructions of 
the Court as given were a proper, clear and understand-
able statement of the law with respect to the issues of 
this case. The essential elements of plaintiff's requested 
Instruction No. 9 as they comply with the applicable law 
were covered by the instructions of the Court. The in-
struction as requested was faulty in two respects, both 
of which relate to its non-conformance to the evidence 
in this case. 
First, the instruction includes the words "if he (de-
fendant) allows himself to get into a condition where an 
accident could happen without his being aware of it or 
able to avoid it." There is no evidence that defendant 
in any way failed to care for himself as he should have, 
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and in fact, the evidence is overwhelming on the point 
that defendant was conscientious and careful in his care 
of his diabetic condition, that he exercised all usual and 
reasonable precautions and that he carefully followed the 
advice and instructions of his physician. 
Second, the instruction went on to state as follows: 
"and if you find the defendant suffered from dia-
betes, and in any manner did not properly care for 
himself so as to allow himself to get into a physi-
cal condition where he could lose control of his 
automobile while operating said automobile ... " 
There is no evidence that defendant did not properly 
care for himself and it is further to be noted that this 
portion of the instruction is thoroughly covered by the 
second paragraph of Instruction No. 10 as given by the 
Court which reads as follows: 
"on the other hand, if the insulin shock that de-
fendant suffered was foreseeable and he could 
have done something about it, and thereby avoided 
the accident, then and in that event he would be 
charged with negligence proximately causing the 
accident.'' 
The distinction drawn between the only authority 
cited by appellant in support of this position, that being 
State v. Olson (Utah) 160 P. 2d 427 is again to be noted. 
POINT V. 
THAT THE COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO GIVE 
PLAINTIFFS' REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 10. 
The respondent contends that this instruction does 
not state the law in that it contains words to the effect 
that if it is found that defendant is suffering from dia-
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betes, a fact which is admitted, it is improper for him to 
operate an automobile and that he must be held liable in 
this case. In support of his contention that this instruc-
tion should have been given appellant, refers to and cites 
Williams v. Frohock (Florida) 114 So. 2d 221, and the 
recited facts of this case include the following: "The 
defendant had suffered loss of consciousness several 
times before, but never while driving." For this reason, 
that case does not conform to the case at bar and must be 
distinguished. The transcript in this case discloses that 
the evidence is uncontradicted to the effect that defendant 
and respondent had suffered minor reactions in the past, 
all of which had been readily controlled and none of which 
had resulted in unconsciousness. (Tr. 135, 136, 140, 141, 
155, 156, 166, 208) It is further to be noted that defendant 
had driven extensively and had held a chauffeurs license 
for a considerable period of time and had never had any 
prior difficulty driving. (Tr. 167, 174, 189, 190, 195, 208) 
Authorities cited by appellant must be distinguished 
on the grounds that prior occurances of a similar nature 
were found to be sufficient as a matter of fact to have 
given warning to defendant on the basis of which he 
should have known he was, or might be, an unsafe person 
to operate an automobile. The subject of foreseeability 
was specifically covered in the Court's instructions, par-
ticularly instructions No. 9 and 10, and, at the very least, 
the facts in this case were certainly sufficient to justify a 
jury finding that the accident was unavoidable on the 
part of defendant. 
24 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CONCLUSION 
Viewing the facts in light most favorable to defend-
ant, the prevailing party in the lower Court, it seems 
clear that this court must conclude that the jury properly 
returned a verdict of no cause of action in favor of de-
fendant on the basis of the accident being unavoidable 
on his part and not in any way caused by or resulting 
from his negligence. The Court carefully and properly 
instructed the jury on the applicable law, setting it forth 
in clear and concise fashion, and certainly including the 
basic elements of negligence and unavoidable accident on 
the basis of which the jury made its determination. 
The essential elements of appellant's requested in-
structions as they properly stated the law were incorpo-
rated and embodied in the instructions of the Court. Cer-
tainly it cannot be reasonably argued that this Court 
should reverse the findings of fact made by the jury and, 
based upon what appellant claims to be preponderance 
of the evidence, award a verdict to appellant. 
The facts are more than adequate to support the 
jury's verdict based upon the law as properly recited by 
the court in its instructions. 
Respondent therefore contends that the verdict of 
the jury in the lower Court must be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CARMAN E. KIPP 
KIPP & CHARLIER 
Attorney for Respondent 
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